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ABSTRACT 
 
It exists different ways for defining a welfare function. Traditionally, welfare economic 
theory foundation is based on the Net Present Value (NPV) calculation where the time 
dependent preferences of considered agents are taken into account. However, the time 
preferences, remains a controversial subject. Currently, the traditional approach employs a 
unique discount rate for various agents. Nevertheless, this way of discounting appears 
inconsistent with sustainable development. New research work suggests that the discount 
rate may not be a homogeneous value. The discount rates may change following the 
individual’s preferences. A significant body of evidence suggests that people do not 
behave following a constant discount rate. In fact, UK Government has quickly recognized 
the power of the arguments for time-varying rates, as it has done in its official guidance to 
Ministries on the appraisal of investments and policies. Other authors deal with not just 
time preference but with uncertainty about future income (precautionary saving). In a 
situation in which economic growth rates are similar across time periods, the rationale for 
declining social optimal discount rates is driven by the preferences of the individuals in the 
economy, rather than expectations of growth. However, these approaches have been 
mainly focused on long-term policies where intergenerational risks may appear. 
 
The traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) uses a unique discount rate derived from 
market interest rates or investment rates of return for discounting the costs and benefits of 
all social agents included in the CBA. However, recent literature showed that a more 
adequate measure of social benefit is possible by using different discount rates including 
inter-temporal preferences rate of users, private investment discount rate and inter-
temporal preferences rate of government. Actually, the costs of opportunity may differ 
amongst individuals, firms, governments, or society in general, as do the returns on 
savings. In general, the firms or operators require an investment rate linked to the current 
return on savings, while the discount rate of consumers-users depends on their time 
preferences with respect of the current and the future consumption, as well as society can 
take into account the intergenerational well-being, adopting a lower discount rate for 
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today’s generation. Time discount rate of social actors (users, operators, government and 
society) places a lower value in a future gain, but the uncertainty about future income 
strongly determines the individual preferences. These time and uncertainty depends on 
preferences and should be integrated into a transport policy formulation that may have 
significant social impacts. The discount rate of a user cannot be the same than the 
operator’s discount rate. The preferences of both are different. 
 
In addition, another school of thought suggests that people, such as a social group, may 
have different attitudes towards future costs and benefits. Particularly, the users have 
different discount rates related to their income. Some research work tried to modify user 
discount rates using a compensating weight which represents the inverse of household 
income level. The inter-temporal preferences are a proxy of the willingness to pay during 
the time. Its consideration is important in order to make acceptable or not a policy or 
investment. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
It exists different ways for identifying transport policy benefits through a welfare function. 
Traditionally, welfare economic theory foundation is based on the Net Present Value 
(NPV) calculation where the time dependent preferences of considered agents are taken 
into account. However, time preferences remain a controversial subject. Currently, the 
traditional approach employs a unique discount rate for various agents. Nevertheless, this 
way of discounting appears inconsistent with sustainable development. New research work 
suggests that the discount rate may not be a homogeneous value (Guzman et al., 20139. 
The discount rates may change following the individual’s preferences. Significant 
evidences suggest that people do not behave following a constant discount rate. In fact, UK 
Government has quickly recognized the power of the arguments for time-varying rates, as 
it has done in its official guidance to Ministries on the appraisal of investments and 
policies. Other authors deal with time preference and uncertainty about future income 
(precautionary saving). In a situation in which economic growth rates are similar across 
time periods, the rationale for declining social optimal discount rates is driven by the 
preferences of the individuals in the economy, rather than expectations of growth. 
 
The traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) uses a unique discount rate derived from 
market interest rate for discounting the costs and benefits of all social agents included in 
the CBA. However, recent literature showed that a more adequate measure of social 
benefit is possible by using different discount rates including inter-temporal preferences 
rate of users, private investors discount rate and inter-temporal preferences rate of 
government (Guzmán, Di Ciommo & Hoz 2013). Actually, the cost of opportunity may 
differ amongst individuals, firms, governments, or society in general, as do the returns on 
savings. In general, the firms or operators require an investment rate linked to the current 
return on savings, while the discount rate of consumers-users depends on their time 
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preferences with respect of the current and the future consumption, as well as society can 
take into account the intergenerational well-being, adopting a lower discount rate for 
today’s generation. Time discount rate of social actor (users, operators, government and 
society) places a lower value in a future gain. Time and uncertainty depends on preferences 
and should be integrated into a transport policy formulation that may have significant 
social impacts. 
 
In addition, another school (Martens, 2011) of thought suggests that people, such as a 
social group, may have different attitudes towards future costs and benefits. Particularly, 
the users have different incomes that determine different inter-temporal preferences. Some 
research work tried to modify user discount rates using a compensating weight which 
represents the inverse of household income level (Wang et al. 2014). However this paper 
shows that even when a higher weight is given to low income users in a cost-benefits 
analysis and they are losing more in terms of time, the congestion pricing implementation 
seems to be a beneficial policy. Two different factors determine this result: 1) the 
generalized composite cost-benefit indicator is positive because of the highest gain of 
upper income people in terms of time saving, and 2) low income people seem to be more 
mechanized trips depending. Actually, mechanized trip dependency has rapidly increased 
for lower skilled and lower income people in European cities like London, Paris and 
Madrid.  This is due to the simultaneous dispersal towards of both workers’ home locations 
(in their search for more affordable housing) and their employment locations (due to the 
flight of jobs  from city centers and the fragmentation of employment activities) (Monzón, 
de la Hoz 2009, Korsu, Wenglenski 2010). They can shift to public transport, but because 
of the mismatch of residential and work locations, when they are excluded by the car use, 
their gain in terms of time saving benefits by congestion pricing will be irrelevant because 
of the gain in terms of time for public transport with congestion pricing is negligible. The 
people who ‘give up’ the tolled highway have to change their mobility strategies; i.e. 
reduce their use of the tolled roads and find new arrangements for their trips (Di Ciommo, 
Lucas 2013). Recently the transport literature has considered not only the income 
affordability and the consequent re-distributional effects of road pricing schemes, but also 
time budget constraints and the issue of time poverty (Palma-Solís et al. 2009). 
 
Two ex-post studies of the equity effects of the Stockholm Congestion Pricing Scheme 
have also re-calculated the expected welfare effects on commuters across income, gender, 
and initial commute mode using observed data on commute mode choice from a panel 
survey of households before and after the trial (Karlström, Franklin 2009). The results 
showed an irregular trend for changes in trip patterns, with the greatest burden of 
congestion pricing falling on the lowest and highest income groups. Work-hour flexibility 
was significantly associated with shifts to an earlier departure time, and this, in turn, was 
correlated with income. In other terms, higher income people showed a more flexible work 
schedule that allows them to more easily avoid the payment of the congestion toll 
(Karlström, Franklin 2009). 
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The literature shows that the time constraints are a crucial point for exploring the social 
equity effects related to the congestion pricing. This paper highlights that a new kind of 
policy analysis should be adopted for checking the social benefits of implemented policy: 
the compositeness of CBA leads to less transparent indicators. Each society is free to adopt 
the social paradigm it wishes, by giving a higher weight to a population group or to 
another. Therefore, a context sensitive indicators for transport planning and a measurement 
framework should be defined for achieving consistent, integrated and transparent 
indicators (Miller, Witlox & Tribby 2013). This paper will contribute to the definition of a 
measurement framework including consistent, disaggregated and transparent indicators. 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Urban agglomerations are complex systems. The behavior of each of its subsystems is a 
highly interrelated and complex task. Interactions between transportation, land-use, travel 
patterns and public policies have to be taken into consideration over long periods of time. 
This system can be termed dynamic because its interactions cause changes over time, and 
is useful in evaluating long-term scenarios where the behavior to be assessed is the 
consequence of complex interactions. 
 
Here, we propose to use a model to assist stakeholders in transport planning decisions, e.g. 
the equity in a road charge scheme in the Madrid Region. Therefore, we used a system 
dynamics (SD) approach consists of linking subsystems of land-use and transport using an 
optimization procedure. The major qualitative SD methods are Causal Loop Diagrams 
(CLDs). CLDs are especially suitable for be used to challenge opposing assessments by 
way of counter-expertise and/or visualization of alternatives and to help to create a 
consensus view of a problem among different stakeholders (Pfaffenbichler 2011). The 
advantage of this SD approach is the possibility to disaggregate the cost-benefits in 
monetary and time terms, per capita and per type of user (low, medium and high income). 
This disaggregation allows defining a transparent and consistent set of indicators and 
identifying the social equity effects. 
 
We have selected the MARS model (Metropolitan Activity Relocation Simulator) 
(Pfaffenbichler, Emberger & Shepherd 2008) because it fits quite well with the 
requirements of the case study and the complexity of the interaction among several 
transport modes and type of activities. The MARS model has been calibrated for the 
regional and metropolitan area of Madrid (Guzmán 2011, Guzmán, Di Ciommo & Hoz 
2013, Guzmán, Hoz & Monzón 2014). The development of the first MARS dates back to 
more than 13 years ago, and it was partially funded by the European Union research 
projects (OPTIMA (May, Shepherd & Timms 2000), FATIMA (May, Timms 2000) and 
PROSPECTS (Minken et al. 2003)). To date, MARS models have been developed for 
many European cities (Edinburg, Helsinki, Leeds, Madrid, Oslo, Stockholm, Bari and 
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Vienna), some Asian cities (Chiang Mai and Ubon Ratchathani in Thailand, and Hanoi in 
Vietnam) and in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The first application of a MARS model in the United 
States has been recently developed for Washington D.C. 
 
MARS-Madrid was developed to simulate the future development of the land-use and 
transportation over time. The model is able to support policy evaluation and scenario 
testing over short, medium and long-term horizons. It uses the concepts of CLD, which 
provide the basis to study the cause and effect among the variables of the transportation 
system and the land-use. The current version of MARS is implemented in Vensim, a 
System Dynamics programming environment based on the analysis of speed vs. O-D 
demand relationships, and includes speed-flow functions that simulate the current transport 
network. These functions are calibrated for Madrid Network with the VISUM® specialized 
transport modeling. 
 
The MARS-Madrid model has been calibrated for the regional and metropolitan area of 
Madrid. The modal split for both commuting trips (home-work) and other trips (home-
other) is calculated using the Madrid 2004 mobility survey. Other data inputs that were 
used in the project include: 
 
 Constant travel time budget: 87 min. 
 Average trips by worker: 2.04. 
 Time value (commuting and other at prices 2004): 10.45 €/h and 5.70 €/h. 
 
Whereas the MARS-Madrid model estimates the mobility patterns on the scenarios 
conditioned by exogenous variables and road charge policy, the optimization procedures 
seek the maximum welfare scenario that may be generated through the congestion 
charging. In general, the optimization of the welfare function considers the same discount 
rate for all agents included in the welfare function (Guzmán, Di Ciommo & Hoz 2013). In 
this paper different rates of discount, depending on the time preferences of each agent have 
been already integrated in the welfare function, showing that the use of more suitable 
discount rates for each social actor had an effect on the selection and definition of optimal 
strategy of congestion pricing. The usefulness of the measure of congestion toll declines 
more quickly over time. This result has been a key issue for understanding the relationship 
between transport system policies and social actors’ benefits distribution in a metropolitan 
context (Guzmán, Di Ciommo & Hoz 2013). 
 
In this context, social welfare function assembles the strategic variables that have been 
optimized. The objective function of MARS-Madrid model is the welfare function (WF), 
including the sum of agents’ social benefits optimized throughout the complete period of 
time. Thus the WF measures the change in social welfare compared to a reference 
scenario: the change in consumer surplus, which includes either the monetary costs (or 
savings) and time savings for users. The variation of the operator benefits includes gains 
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linked to revenues from fares and charges. The change of government benefits includes 
fuel tax revenues, and investment savings related with road costs maintenance. Finally, the 
variation of benefits for the society related with the external costs includes reduction of 
accidents, greenhouse gas emissions and pollution costs (Guzmán, Hoz & Monzón 2014). 
 
The congestion-pricing scheme assessment has the objective to identify as precisely as 
possible the distributional effects for different population groups of users, where we take 
their individual characteristics such as income, location, travel patterns and car 
ownership/use characteristics. The toll scheme is implemented only for passenger vehicles. 
 
2.1 Social welfare estimation 
The objective function identified with the social welfare function assembles the strategic 
variables that have been optimized. The objective function of the LUTI model is the 
welfare function (WF), including the sum of all social benefits optimized throughout the 
complete period of time (Guzmán, Di Ciommo & Hoz 2013). 
 
Thus the WF showed in Equation (1) measures the change in social welfare compared to 
the reference scenario. This function is defined by the following elements: the change in 
consumer surplus (ΔCSijm), which includes either the monetary costs (or savings) and time 
savings for users, resulting through the implementation of toll ring policy. The variation of 
the operator benefits (ΔOijm) includes gains linked to revenues from fares and charges. The 
change of government benefits (ΔGijm) includes fuel tax revenues, and investment savings 
related with road costs maintenance. Finally, the variation of benefits for the society 
related with the external costs (ΔEijm) includes reduction of accidents, greenhouse gas 
emissions and pollution costs. 
 
ܹܨ ൌ ∑ ∑ ൣሺ1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௨ሻ௧ሻ ∙ ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൅ ሺ1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௢ሻ௧ሻ ∙ ∆ ௜ܱ௝௠ሺݐሻ ൅ ൫1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௚ሻ௧൯ ∙௜௝௠୬௧ୀ଴
∆ܩ௜௝௠ሺݐሻ ൅ ሺ1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௘ሻ௧ሻ ∙ ∆ܧ௜௝௠ሺݐሻ൧                 (1) 
 
The final evaluation is expressed by net present value (NPV) over the different scenarios, 
and using different discount rates (ru, ro, rg, re,) according with the considered social agents 
(users income level, operators, government and society). The government and the society 
social discount rate in this paper will be the same. The variable t represent the period of 
time. The variable m is the transport mode. The i and j subscripts refer to origin and 
destination zones, respectively. The estimated emissions value and casualties avoided is 
shown in Guzmán, Di Ciommo and Hoz (2013). 
 
2.2 Consumer surplus computation 
The Equation (2) shows the change in consumer surplus. This equation measures the 
change in social welfare compared to the reference scenario. This function is defined by 
the change in consumer surplus, which includes either the monetary costs (or savings) and 
time savings for users, resulting through the implementation of congestion-pricing scheme. 
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∆ܥܵ ൌ ∑ ∑ ∑ ൣሺ1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௟ሻ௧ሻ ∙ ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௝௠௟ ሺݐሻ ൅ ሺ1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௠ሻ௧ሻ ∙ ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௝௠௠ ሺݐሻ ൅௟௠௛௜௝௠௡௧ୀ଴
ሺ1/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௛ሻ௧ሻ ∙ ∆ܥ ௜ܵ௝௠௛ ሺݐሻ൧                    (2) 
 
The final result is expressed by net present value (NPV) over the different scenarios, and 
using different discount rates (rl, rm, rh) according with the considered income groups (low, 
medium and high). 
 
The user-type is characterized by a commuting trip from one zone to another and has a 
travel generalized costs in terms of time and money according to the transport mode 
chosen. Then, the assessment of the proposed congestion-pricing scheme includes users 
travel costs from this individual change. We call this like the total consumer surplus 
change (∆CS) for the individual through the ‘‘rule of a half’’. The consumer surplus from a 
change in travel times and/or travel costs should in general be calculated at the level of 
origin-destination pair (Guzmán, Di Ciommo & Hoz 2013). 
 
∆ܥ ௜ܵ௝௠௥ ሺݐሻ ൎ ଵଶ∑ ∑ ∑ ൣ ௜ܶ௝௠଴ ሺݐሻ௥ ൅ ௜ܶ௝௠ଵ ሺݐሻ௥൧ ∙ ൣܩ௜௝௠଴ ሺݐሻ௥ െ ܩ௜௝௠ଵ ሺݐሻ௥൧௟௠௛௜௝௠௧       (3) 
ൎ 12෍෍෍ൣ ௜ܶ௝௠
଴ ሺݐሻ௥ ൅ ௜ܶ௝௠ଵ ሺݐሻ௥൧ ∙ ൫ܥ௜௝௠ଵ ሺݐሻ௥ ൅ ݐ௜௝௠ଵ ሺݐሻ௥ ∙ ܸܱ ௜ܶ െ ܥ௜௝௠଴ ሺݐሻ௥ െ ݐ௜௝௠଴ ሺݐሻ௥ ∙ ܸܱ ௜ܶ൯
௟௠௛௜௝௠௧
 
 
Where Tkijm is the demand for trips between i and j by mode m, in the k scenario; Gkijm is 
travel generalized cost; Ckijm is total travel cost including charging and operation cost; tkijm 
is the travel time; and VOTi is the value of time. If we let 0 and 1 denote ‘‘before’’ and 
‘‘after’’ the congestion-pricing scheme, we will calculate the difference between 0 and 1 
scenarios. The superscript k is used to denote either the scenarios. 
 
Consumer surplus (i.e., the difference between user utility and its cost) implied a higher 
consideration for the high income users because it increases with the income of users. In 
other words, the consumer surplus of high income households has a higher weight with 
respect of the low income people. In this work, the income differences of people are 
included in the user utility (r), to partially correct this possible distortion and a higher inter-
temporal preferences rate is used for low income population group. 
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Fig 1 – Conceptual foundation of multidimensional indicators for a toll ring policy 
Based in Miller 
 
 
 
3. CASE STUDY  
 
We propose a charging system which is defined by a cordon line: the area inside the ring 
road known as the M-30. The area of study has a high provision of public transportation, 
both in terms of coverage and service. In the base and alternative scenarios, projections 
were made for economic and population growth based on data from the Institute of 
Statistics in Madrid (Guzmán, Di Ciommo & Hoz 2013). 
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Fig. 2 – Modeled area and City center area 
 
Low income (rl) ≤ 1.100 €/month per household 
Medium income (rm) between 1.100 and 3.100 €/month per household 
High income (rh) > 3.100 €/month per household 
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Fig. 3 – Madrid Region income levels by zone 
 
Region of Madrid in 2004 was about 6.5 million inhabitants. According with this income 
distribution map, the low-income population is around 9% of the total. The medium-
income people are 72% and high-income, 19%. The spatial income distribution shows that 
the highest income populations are localized in the northern part, while low income people 
in the southern part, with some interstitial zones.  
 
3.1 Toll policy implementation 
This method can be applied to optimize several types of transport policies; however in this 
case, the optimization process is proposed with an application of two variables: a toll-
pricing policy profile for passenger vehicles (initial and final toll value) in Madrid city 
center. The introduction of the concept of “policy profiles” allows specifying policy 
instrument levels and optimized them for two points over time. 
 
The introduction of the concept of “policy profiles” allows policy instrument levels to be 
specified and later optimized over the time. We define the main characteristics of a policy 
profile through X(tA) and X(tL) as the levels of the policy attributes respectively in the 
initial year tA (the value of the policy when it is introduced) and in the short, medium and 
long-run (the final policy value after the intermediate adjustments). Similarly, tA is the year 
in which the policy is introduced (tA =2012 in this study) and tL identifies the end of the 
evaluation period on which the policy is evaluated (tL =2017). The tS value is any 
intermediate evaluation point; we assume the toll increases linearly between the toll level 
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selected for tA and tL. The levels of instrument in intermediate years X(t) are determined by 
interpolating a linear function, and the level is then assumed constant for any year after the 
tL year as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4 – Instrument profile for continuous instruments 
 
3.2 Scenario definition 
In order to explore the social equity effects of a toll scheme values under different discount 
rates for each kind of user, an integrated framework was proposed seeking the maximum 
social welfare. These scenarios were compared with a baseline (labeled the do-nothing 
scenario), where no policy measures were assumed. Under a do-nothing scenario, the 
social welfare variation is assumed to be zero. Do-nothing scenario is needed to quantify 
the impact of transportation policies. In this case we propose three different scenarios: 
 
1. Scenario 1. Estimate an optimal congestion toll values, using different rates of discount, 
depending on the time preferences of each agent (users, operators, government and 
society), as is shown and discussed in Guzmán, Di Ciommo and Hoz (2013). The optimum 
toll value obtained in alternative scenario behind the condition of the maximization of the 
NPV of the WF proposed will measure the social welfare compared to the reference 
scenario. 
2. Scenario 2. Taking the optimal toll values results from Scenario 1, social welfare function 
is calculated again, but taking into account the income level groups and according to this, 
we used the discount rates shown in Figure 5. This will allow the discussion if consider 
equal or different user discount rates, influences on social welfare and whether this type of 
instrument is regressive or progressive. 
3. Scenario 3. A toll ring policy is optimized using the user income level rates shown in 
Figure 5, so that it is possible to evaluate whether the inclusion of discount rates 
differentiated by type of user, can improve the WF performance with respect to equity. 
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Fig. 5 – Discount rates by user type (low, medium and high income) 
 
This paper aims to assess a new method by integrating different types of discount rate 
belonging to different social actors and income-level users in order to measure the real 
benefits of each actor in the short term (2012-2017). Table 1 show the scenarios used in 
this study. 
 
 Scenarios 
 1 2 3 
User discount rates    
Low 5.5% Variable:  
Figure 5 
Variable:  
Figure 5 Medium 5.5% High 5.5% 
Other social agents discount rates    
Operators 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 
Government 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Society 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Toll values  Optimum  Scenario 1  Optimum 
Table 1 – Scenarios tested 
 
A sensitivity analysis varying discount rates of social agents proves the consistency of the 
results of the simulation. 
 
4. RESULTS  
Increasing the travel cost by car to the city center (peak period), car traffic entering the 
cordon zone is reduced after the toll ring policy was implemented. But this reduction is 
according to the income level. According to the population distribution by income level 
(Figure 3), the toll policy affects mostly the medium-income population (68%) as is shown 
in Figure 6. 
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Reference scenario  Scenario 1 
Fig 6 – Car use in trips to the city center by income level 2017 
 
The car use increases with income level (Figure 7). As expected and compared with the 
reference scenario, the low-income people are the most affected group: the car trips 
reduction to the city center is between 3 and 26% according to scenario evaluated (value of 
toll fees). This means an absolute change in modal shift of 5.3% (Figure 8). Similarly, they 
are also the group who make the bigger modal shift from car to PT, once toll policy is 
implemented. 
 
 
Reference scenario  Scenario 1 
Fig 7 – Motorized modal split to the city center by income level 2017 
 
This means that the low-income people lose 5.3 points in the car use share, which is a 
decrease in relative terms of 22.5%. Since low-income car trips to the city center are the 
minority (3.6%), this policy makes this proportion is even lower. 
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Fig 8 – Modal split changes before/after toll ring implementation by income level 
 
Compared with the modal split of reference scenario, these results shows that Scenarios 1 
and 2 present a bigger modal shift, but because the toll value is higher than Scenario 3 (see 
Table 2). However the modal split can show a first lead about the toll policy equity: the 
lower-income people are the most affected group. While a significant percentage of low 
and middle-income people change from car to public transport, the high-income group uses 
more their cars. 
 
The social welfare function strategy shows a general positive social welfare enough to 
cover the generated costs. The time saving, is significant after the cordon toll 
implementation, however, the losing agent is the car user for whom the increased saving 
time is not enough to cover the monetary costs. 
 
Analyzing the consumer surplus (user surplus) variations in all scenarios (Table 2), it is 
possible to conclude that in absolute time saving terms, the medium-income group is the 
most benefited, but at the same time, they are the ones who pay more (money savings). 
This social group is the one who contributes most to the variation of welfare. This occurs 
because they are the majority of the population of Madrid (72%). However, to study and 
compare which group is the most affected by the toll policy, it is necessary to analyze in 
relative terms, for example, variation of the costs/benefits per capita. 
 
Scenario 1 2 3 
Social Welfare (M€) 74.85 79.04 80.98 
Toll value 
optimum 
Year tA tL tA tL tA tL 2012 2017 2012 2017 2012 2017 
Value (€) X(tA) X(tL) X(tA) X(tL) X(tA) X(tL) 1.5 2.5 1.5 * 2.5 * 2.3 0.2 
Consumer Surplus 
(M€) Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Time savings    
Car users 4.4 75.2 44.9 2.9 54.7 38.3 2.9 52.5 35.1 
PT users 10.6 72.6 9.5 6.7 52.5 8.0 6.4 49.6 7.2 
   .  
 
 
Money savings    
Car users -16.2 -326.2 -142.0 -11.4 -254.6 -126.6 -10.3 -223.5 -106.8
PT users 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total benefit users -1.3 -178.5 -87.6 -1.8 -147.4 -80.3 -1.0 -121.3 -64.5 
Table 2 – Consumer surplus: alternative scenarios/reference scenario of the Madrid 
road charge scheme [NPV M€] 
* Is not the optimum. 
 
Given the amount of population by each income group, apparently we found that who lose 
the most, are those with higher incomes (Table 3).  
 
The obtained results show that high income social group will benefit from the time 
savings. The time savings benefices mainly car users that can still use the cars after the toll 
implementation. These results are in line with the observed modal changes in modal split 
between the based scenario and scenario 1 Figure 6.  
 
Scenario 1 2 3 
Income group Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Time savings 24.6 31.6 41.5 15.8 22.9 35.4 15.3 21.9 32.4 
Car users 7.2 16.1 34.3 4.8 11.7 29.3 4.7 11.3 26.8 
PT users 17.43 15.5 7.2 11.0 11.2 6.1 10.6 10.6 5.6 
Money savings -26.7 -69.8 -108.5 -18.8 -54.5 -96.8 -17.0 -47.8 -81.6 
Car users -26.7 -69.8 -108.5 -18.8 -54.5 -96.8 -17.0 -47.8 -81.6 
PT users 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Total savings -2.1 -38.2 -67.0 -3.0 -31.6 -61.4 -1.7 -26.0 -49.3 
Table 3 – Costs/benefits per capita [NPV €] 
 
But we get another issue: although the high-income people pay more for use their cars, the 
relative cost per household is not equal, because the income is different between each 
group, like presented in table  
Indicator Ratio Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Time saving per 
cápita 
X high income/ X low 
income 
1.69 
 
2.24 
 
X high income/ X 
medium income 
1.31 1.54 
 
Cost savings per 
capita / income  
X high income/ X low 
income 
0.61 
 
0.55 
 
X high income/ X 
medium income 
0.62 
 
0.53 
 
 
 
 
Comparing the indicators in respect to income affordability measured in monetary terms, 
the advantages seems to be for low income user-type, while using the time saving measure 
   .  
 
 
the advantages is lower for low-income than for higher income users. The results are 
respected when the optimization is done using the same discount rate or different discount 
rates for each kind of income user-type. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
When calculating the money savings per capita relative to the average income-level, we 
find that the low-income population pay (additional transport costs) around 2% more that 
the medium-income population. These results seem quite fair. But, if we analyze the 
differences between low and high-income groups, the results show that the low-income 
people. Comparing the medium and high-income group, the results are similar: the 
medium-income people pay 61% more. This finding seems to reinforce the idea expressed 
in Guzmán, Di Ciommo and Hoz (2013), saying that the congestion pricing is a regressive 
policy measure. The practical implications of these results are relevant in terms of transport 
and equity analysis, showing how a congestions pricing could be a regressive measure for 
lower income people. 
 
But what happens now if travelers have time preferences differentiated according to their 
income level? The Scenario 2 shows that when it is assumed that low-income people have 
a shorter vision (in money terms) than high-income people the low-income people has an 
higher discount rates as shown in Figure 5. In this case the ratio of time saving between  is 
much higher higher and lower income people. The use of different discount rates stress the 
possible inequality of burdens and benefices produced by the congestion pricing.  
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